The tree and the forest: an analogy for individual and collective identities

In my last blog, I examined Bracher’s view of how historicism is an impediment to identity formation. While I did not agree with this view, I nevertheless concluded that his assertion might be right after all, and that his views may actually explain why racism and prejudice will continue to thrive within the society (Ayo Aladejebi, Blog 5, 2012).

Over the past weeks, I have been struggling to understand how an individual’s identity is impacted and defined by the society. I have tried to analyse how an African proverb, “a tree cannot make a forest”, fits into this phenomenon. Assuming this proverb is accurate, it is important to explore how it interfaces with the concept of identity as presented in both Bracher and Wenger.

Bracher defines identity as “one’s sense of oneself and, more comprehensively, the sense of oneself as a force that matters in the world” (Bracher, 2006, p. 6). Bracher’s definition explicitly revolves around the notion of self and the individual. Bracher, right from the onset, dissociates his definition of identity from membership within the social setting of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, social class, nationality, age and religion. He goes on to present certain factors – “continuity, consistency, agency, distinction, belonging, and meaning” – which he describes as “distinct qualities” that an individual must experience in order for their identity to be fully validated (p. 6).

Wenger’s identity position, on the other hand, subscribes to the belief that identity is a “pivot between the social and the individual” (Wenger, 1999, p. 145). He explains that identity formation is not exclusively a concept of the individual and neither is it entirely an object of the society. Wenger contends that identity is, essentially an abstraction of both – the individual and the society. He explains that while it is important to acknowledge the individual within the construct of identity, it is also prudent to understand that the individual is an active participant within a shared community. He argues that separating the individual from the collective can be an arduous task as both concepts intertwine and the existence of one is not independent of the other (p. 146).

Comparing Wenger and Bracher, and their views of identity takes me back to my opening paragraph about the statement that “a tree does not make a forest”. Critically examining this proverb, I quickly realize the absence of a crucial piece which should be an addendum to the statement. It is apparent that Bracher, with the mind of a psychoanalyst, sees identity as starting and ending with the individual (Bracher, 2006, p. 14) while Wenger, a social learning theorist, sees identity as a continuous flow between the individual and the social, and often, with an obliterated boundary.

My postscript to the African proverb, “a tree cannot make a forest” would read something like this: but continuous cutting of the tree can create the demise of the forest. One of the unique features of Africentric learning is the recognition of the individual within the collective. It is also grounded in the belief that neither is of more importance than the other. Merriweather Hunn (2004) explains the interdependency of the individual and the community:

Communalism is expressed in an African proverb that says that a stream will never rise higher than its source. The individuals represent the stream, and the collective body represents the source. They are intricately connected and bound to each other. There is a sense of accountability and respect for each other (Merriweather Hunn, 2004, p. 69)

            Wenger, stating his position on identity, is quick to distant himself from the opinion that “there is an inherent conflict between the individual and the collective” (Wenger, 1999, p. 146). He also reiterates that, to say that the individual is a symbol of “freedom and creativity” while the collective is seen as imposing “constraints and limitations” or vice versa, would be tantamount to an erroneous assumption (p. 147). Bracher’s argument that identity bearing within the collective is constricting raises the question of what is real and what is not. He explains that collective identity gives an individual a false sense of self. He argues that an individual becomes disengaged with his or her true identity, and automatically assumes the identity of the group (Bracher, 2006, p. 114).

            Critical view of both assertions – Bracher’s and Wenger’s – will reveal that one position is not necessarily better than the other. My identity as an individual has changed periodically depending on context and location. I have assumed the identity of a son, a husband, and a father. This does not change the fact that I am a student, an employment specialist, and it does not minimize the fact that intertwined within these listed identities lies the fact that I am a Christian, a Nigerian, an African, a Canadian, an African Canadian and an African Nova Scotian.

While there are instances where these identities conflict with one another and sometimes make me question my true individual identity, they are nonetheless an integral part of my being. It is also worth noting that sometimes, I have had to assume some of these identities in order to conform to societal perception of who I am or should be. A case in reality is the fact that I became a Canadian citizen over a decade ago, but I am still required to answer the omnipresent question: where are you from?

            Going back to the idea of a tree not being able to declare itself a forest, and a forest not being able to exist without trees, it becomes apparent how intricate the identity of an individual is linked to the society. Looking at identity from the lens of Africentrism, one can see a parallel between the analogy of a “river not rising higher than its source” (Merriweather Hunn, 2004, p.69) and Wenger’s assertion that:

We cannot become human by ourselves; hence a reified, physiologically based notion of individuality misses the interconnectedness of identity (Wenger, 1999, p. 146).

References

Bracher, M. (2006). Radical Pedagogy: Identity, Generativity, and Social Transformation.

Psychoanalysis, Education, and Social Transformation, New York, NY: Palgrave

Macmillan

Merriweather Hunn, Lisa (2004). Africentric philosophy: a remedy for Eurocentric dominance.

New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education (102), 65-74.

Wenger. E. (1999). Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity. Cambridge,

Mass.: Cambridge University Press.

History, identity formation and the dilemma of blackness

When one of my colleagues exclaimed that Bracher’s analysis in Radical Pedagogy: Identity, Generativity, and Social Transformation were that of a reductionist, it did not quite sink in until I read the ninth chapter of the book.

A reductionist posits that “the simple is the source of the complex”, and ultimately concludes that in order to understand the bigger picture, you just have to look at the bits and pieces existing within it. It does, in essence, create a potential alienation of other important elements that may comprise the whole. Therefore, reading Bracher’s explanation of how historicism is, in essence, a deterrent to radical pedagogy, I cannot but wonder how such notion can have serious consequences on my identity as a person of African descent. Based on my understanding of this chapter, my personal experience, and a shared experience as a member of the Black community, I have decided to highlight how the dichotomy in Bracher’s assertion can create a dilemma for people of African descent. I will also analyse how this notion can insidiously perpetuate intolerance towards marginalized people within the society at large.

Bracher refers to the writings of German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Bracher, Nietzsche asserts that history breeds passivity among its proponent. He also contends that the lessons of history can “be learned from a relatively small piece of history” – a reductionist approach to history (Bracher, 2006, p. 111). Using Nietzsche’s quote from “On the Use and Abuse of History”, Bracher explains that an individual who has been immersed in the ideology of history is bound to be initiated into a life of culture rather than a life of living. He argues that the life of culture creates a way of thinking which is essentially from the past and has little or no bearing on the present, and if anything, it actually stifles an individual’s understands of the present (p. 111).

Bracher makes a passionate argument that history is a constriction to the identity of individual. He explains that history creates a sense of communal identity in the name of unity at the expense of the identities of individuals within the group. He wonders whether the benefit of unifying identity created by history is worth the consequent cost of “human suffering and injustice” that can emanate from it. Bracher further argues that identities such as: American, Canadian, African, White, Black, Woman, Gay, Lesbian result in elation for individuals whenever they are validated, and create uneasiness and even lead to anger when threatened (p. 112)

While it is daunting to agree with Bracher’s exposition on the role of history in suppressing identity formation, it is also important to critically look at how his assertions correlates with the experiences of those who have been the subject of repression and oppression. Bracher’s take on the role of history on identity formation is a double edged sword for the proponents of Africentrism. The foundation of Africentrism is built on the fact that Africa’s contributions have been written out of world history, and it posits that this is essentially a creation of Eurocentric hegemony. Bracher’s analysis corroborates this assertion. Describing how history can become a backbone for the creation of a dominant culture, he explains:

as feminist, African American, and other critics have pointed out, Dead white European male literary histories promote suppression and oppression of,  and repression in, those (women, racial and ethnic minorities, and others) whose attributes are not recognized in these history (p. 113)

Comparing Bracher’s take on history and its implication on identity, with that of an Africentric scholar, Merriweather Hunn on the impact of Eurocentric hegemony on world history, it does not take long to see a parallel in discourse:

Eurocentrism places the history, culture, and philosophical perspectives of people of European descent in a privileged, more valuable position than any other world culture. Eurocentrism, especially in the U.S. context, disguises itself as a universal perspective from which every culture must evaluate its experiences. It denies the value of other cultural and historical perspectives as ways of seeing and understanding the world (Merriweather Hunn, 2004, p. 2)

The preceding is in congruence with Bracher’s position that history is a tool, which different groups can use to assert that their “identity bearing is grounded in the real” and therefore “is not in need of or capable of embracing or even tolerating internal or external otherness” (Bracher, 2006, p. 113). In this regards, it suffices to conclude that Bracher’s discourse parallels that of the Africentists, and there ends the similarity!

Furthermore, Bracher explains that history is also tool used by disenfranchised group to counter the effect of suppression and marginalisation, which ironically has been created by history itself. Merriweather Hunn (2004) defines Africentrism as the embodiment of the experiences of generations of people of African descent, which needs to be fully documented and brought to the core of the existence of present generation of Black people. It does not take long to see that the premise of Africentrism is built around history – the history of black people, and without history, Africentrism loses its potency (Merriweather Hunn, 2004, p. 4)

The other aspect of Bracher’s discourse (and perhaps a more disturbing one) on history and indentity formation contends that, while history is used as a counter tool to fight the hegemonic building blocks of the dominant culture, this very action can also result in what he describes as “providing recognition” (Bracher, 2006, p. 114). Bracher explains that the inclusion of histories of different groups (such as that of people of African descent) into the mainstream will ultimately result in the vulnerability of these groups. According to Bracher, members of these groups are tempted “to put all their identity eggs into this single narrative basket”. His assertion is that, once this identity, as previously stated, is threatened, it can result in despondency and consequently “identity depletion” (p. 114).

I am afraid that Bracher is right in his assessment! One of the dilemmas faced by Black people is entrenched within this frustration of identity. We can all agree that much progress has been made in bridging the gap, and creating tolerance and understanding within the context of society. Nevertheless, it is still perplexing, when as a Black person I have to explain why I live in an affluent sub-division, why I am the only black person on the board of director of one of the largest non-denominational churches in Nova Scotia. It is becoming tiring when my wife has to continuously explain that she is on the medical staff at Capital Health and not a janitorial staff.

Drawing on Bracher’s assertion, every time I sit in class with members of my cohort, I can only imagine how we are perceived within the academic environment. Is anyone out there questioning our scholarly capability? At the end of the day, will someone question the fact that our Master’s Degree is not of equal calibre with the general stream? These are some of the questions raging through my mind, and have become more pronounced after reading this particular chapter in Bracher’s Radical pedagogy: Identity, Generativity, and Social Transformation.

References

Bracher, M. (2006). Radical Pedagogy: Identity, Generativity, and Social Transformation.

Psychoanalysis, Education, and Social Transformation, New York, NY: Palgrave

Macmillan

Merriweather Hunn, Lisa (2004). Africentric philosophy: a remedy for Eurocentric dominance.

New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education (102), 65-74.